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THE MODEL STATE GUARD ACT'
GEORGE W. BACONt
T HE only really new contribution to the art of warfare so far dis-closed by the present conflict in Europe is the skilful and wide-
spread employment of a "fifth column" behind the defending army.
The more or less well defined zone of former wars known as the "battle
front" may now be spread across an entire country. It has been proven
in Norway and the Low Countries that the well prepared action of the
"fifth column", coordinated with the action of his conventional military
forces, may contribute decisively to the victory of the enemy. The
creation of confusion and panic among the civil population, the sabotage
of communication facilities, the destruction of industrial plants and
munitions, and the seizure of airports, are only a few of the duties as-
signed to the new auxiliary of the military. To assist the "fifth column",
the enemy may be expected to drop groups of parachute troops or to
land "airplane infantry" at appropriate spots well behind the "fighting
front" of the regular armies.
These new techniques indicate that whenever war threatens or is
actually in progress any peaceful city or village must not be surprised
to discover an unsuspected nest of vipers in its midst suddenly aroused
to its deadly work. Simultaneously, perhaps, the community will re-
ceive a parish call from a group of parachutists armed to the teeth for
no pleasant purposes. As was said by Under Secretary of War Patter-
son, " ... the wars of today know no front lines; a tiny village hundreds
of miles from the theoretical front may suddenly become the scene of
desperate and blazing action."2
The means of coping with these rear zone attacks upon national
defense cannot be left to improvisation. The United States Army cannot
be expected to scatter its forces in the hundreds of places where sub-
versive action may suddenly blaze out. Its mission is to meet the main
battle line of the enemy and to knock it out. Although the police forces
1. The draft of the Model State Guard Act was the work of many men. Among them
were judge Richard Hartshorne, President of the Interstate Commerce Commission on
Crime and member of the joint-Conference Committee of the Federal-State Conference on
Law Enforcement Problems of National Defense which fathered the Act; R. Keith Kane,
Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States; and Paul B. Carroll of
the Fordham University Law School Faculty. Others are hereafter mentioned; see notes 3
and 68 infra and text, page 43 infra.
t Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
2. Quoted in the New York Times, November 19th, 1940, from an address in Indian-
apolis.
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of the states and municipalities are competent to cope with sporadic out-
bursts of subversive activity it has long been recognized that in periods
of grave public danger they need to be supplemented. For that reason we
have, in ordinary times, the National Guard. But if war is imminent or
actually in progress the forces of the National Guard will have been
withdrawn for service in the national army. Hence the need of a State
Guard to fill its place under such circumstances.
The Federal-State Conference
The leaders of a number of organizations concerned with efficient
methods of putting down crime and implementing national defense efforts
with state aid joined forces last summer, with the Department of Justice
cooperating, and formed the Federal-State Conference on Law Enforce-
ment Problems of National Defense. The participating organizations
are the Governors' Conference, The Council of State Governments, The
National Association of Attorneys General, and The Interstate Commis-
sion on Crime. The object of the Federal-State Conference is primarily
to study the need of state legislation or administrative regulation in the
interest of national defense and to prepare and obtain the enactment
of legislation and the promulgation of regulations found to be desirable.
In November the drafting committee called together by the Conference
met in Washington and revised several Acts which had been drafted
meanwhile and which will be proposed to the state legislatures at their
forthcoming sessions.3 One of them is the Model State Guard Act and
another is the Model Act Providing For Fresh Pursuit By Military
Forces.4
While those two acts were in course of drafting several consultations
were held with Brigadier-General Tyner together with his aides, Brig-
3. These additional bodies were represented at the meeting of the drafting committee:
The Advisory Commission of the Council on National Defense; The Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws; and the International Association of Chiefs of Police.
Sub-committees first considered each proposed Act. Then the whole committee took up
the revised forms section by section. The members of the sub-committee on the Model State
Guard Act are given in note 68 infra.
4. Others are: A Model Sabotage Prevention Act, designed to protect property by
making criminal certain unlawful entries on, injuries to and interferences with property,
wilfully defective workmanship, and authorizing the closing of streets; a Model Explosives
Act, regulating the manufacture, sale, distribution, use and possession of explosives; and
a Model Act for the Protection of Public Property, authorizing the appointment and
prescribing the powers and duties of special policemen for the protection and preservation
of public property.
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adler-General Kilbreth and Colonel Herbst, all of whom are retired offi-
cers of the United States Army. General Tyner, as Chief of Staff to
Major-General William Ottman, Commander of the, New York State
Guard, has already completed the organization of a State Guard under the
existing provisions of the Military Law of New York.5 Thus he was in
a position to recommend provisions based on his practical experience
and his advice and assistance were most valuable to the committee in
charge of the acts. The committee also had the advantage of the advice
of Colonel J. M. Churchill, Chief, Civil Defense Branch, Operations
and Training Division, G 3, War Department General Staff. Colonel
Churchill also detailed Major E. W. Riddings of his division to sit with
the committee of the Federal-State Conference when the drafting was
completed. The Committee, therefore, has had the benefit of expert
advice and criticism.
Militia Laws
Although it is not generally known by laymen, the' constitution or
statute law of every state provides that all able-bodied male citizens, be-
tween the ages of eighteen and forty-five years, who are residents of
the state, are members of the militia.6 The militia is usually divided
into two classes, the "active", comprising the National Guard and the
Naval Militia and the "unorganized", comprising the rest.7 Provision
is made for calling out the unorganized militia for active duty in case
of "breach of the peace, tumult, riot or resistance to process of this
state, or imminent danger thereof."8 A regular organization with a pro-
gram of training apparently is not intended by such provisions. It seems
to be contemplated that the members of the unorganized militia are to
be called up on short notice as a sort of posse comitatus to aid the police
forces and the National Guard during sudden emergencies and are to
be returned to their civilian status as soon as the emergency passes.
However, several states have adopted acts or included provisions in
their military law which provide for an organized State Guard distinct
from the National Guard.9
S. N. Y. Consol. Laws, Chap. 37, Art. 1.
6. Certain clas-es of persons are exempted. For a typical statute see the N. Y. M ARY
LAW § 1, N. Y. Consol. Laws, Chap. 37, § 1.
7. Some States call the second class "the reserve militia." In one state, Indiana, the
inactive militia is called "sedentary militia." IND. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin, 1934) § 10854.
Florida provides for a Marine Corps in addition to the National 'Guard and Naval Militia.
FIA. Coar,. Gm. LAws AwN. (Skillman, 1927) § 2015. Usually able-bodied males who have
declared their intention to become citizens are also includedlin the militia.
8. IND. STAT. AxN. (Burns, 1933) § 45-701. This is a typical provision.
9. The statutes of some states authorize the governor to organize a state' guard sep-
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One defect of the militia laws of many states is, then, that there is no
provision for replacing the National Guard with a body of organized
troops trained to cope with the "fifth column" and small units of enemy
forces like parachutists and airplane troops. Another defect is that the
age limit of members of the unorganized militia who may be drafted
into service is set at forty-five years and this age limit appears to be
true also as to volunteers who may be accepted for service.10 The War
Department tells us that the average age of veterans of the World War
at this time is forty-five. Thus under the law of practically all of the
states a number of capable, experienced and able-bodied men who would
be glad to volunteer for service in the State Guard are excluded.
The State Guards, of course, will not be called upon to undertake the
severe physical hardship of a protracted campaign. They will be used
locally and for short periods. To quote Under Secretary of War
Patterson again, these troops must prepare "a comprehensive program
of organization and training for guard duty, handling disorderly crowds
and overcoming the light resistance of armed forces."" There are many
citizens, veterans and others, who are more than forty-five years of age
arately from the national guard without reference to the absence of the latter. The follow-
ing are typical provisions: GA. CODE ANN. (Park, et al., 1936) tit. 86, § 1501-3 (may be
organized "for the purpose of protecting the property of the State and the lives, liberty
and property of the people of the State.") N. Y. MrrARY LAW, § 5-a (may be organized
by the governor "as he may deem to be for the public interest.")
In some states a temporary military force to replace the National Guard may be or-
ganized only when a part thereof is called into federal service. For instance: ALA. CODE
ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1936) § 1600 (83); PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 51, § 171.
(Pennsylvania has the most elaborate of the state guard acts now on the books.) Arizona
has an uncommon provision: "whenever the national guard may prove inadequate to
execute the laws." REv. CODn ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 2196. Quaere: If the National
Guard is in federal service is it "inadequate to execute the laws"? It would seem so.
In most states it seems that no provision is made for a temporary military force, except
that in time of riot, insurrection, invasion, or imminent danger thereof, drafts may be
may from the unorganized militia. For example: VT. Pun. LAws (1933) § 8051. Some
states add "emergency", as in CAL. MiL. & VET. CODE (Deering, 1937) § 128. Quaere: Does
the absence of part or all the National Guard in federal service create an emergency?
In Delaware no provision in the Constitution or laws appears to be made for active
use of military forces other than the National Guard. DEL. REv. CODE (1935). This also
appears to be the case in Oklahoma. OrTA. STAT. ANT. (1936) tit. 44.
10. In New Jersey however, the upper age limit for the State Guard, as distinguished
from the National Guard, is fifty-five years for enlisted men, and sixty-four years for
officers. N. J. Laws, 1937, c. 49, Art. XII, § 2. In Pennsylvania, the age limits for the
State Guard are left to be fixed by the governor from time to time. PA. STAT. ArN. (Pur-
don, 1930) § 210.
11. Quoted in the New York Times, November 19th, 1940, from an address in Indian-
apolis.
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who will fit into such a program." Still another defect in existing stat-
utes is that no provision is made for the use of militia or state guards
outside the state under certain circumstances that will be discussed
later.23 Before taking up the.provisions of the Model State Guard Act,
which it is hoped will correct these deficiencies if it is enacted, a word
needs to be said as to the authority of the states to create military forces
of this character.
The Enabling Act
It is disputed whether the United States Constitution permits the
states to maintain an organized state guard without express Congres-
sional approval. Diverse views on this question were presented in a
debate in the Senate on October 8th, 1940.14 On the one hand it was
argued that the states may not maintain troops without the consent of
Congress. The pertinent part of Article I, Section 10, Clause 3, of the
Constitution declares that:
"No State shall, without the consent of Congress, . . . keep troops, or ships
of war in time of peace .... "
Article I, Section 8, Clause 16, provides:
"The Congress shall have power.., to provide for organizing, arming, and
disciplining the militia ... reserving to the States respectively the appointment
of the officers and the authority of training the militia according to the dis-
cipline prescribed by Congress."
These sections seem to be clear enough and (1) to prohibit the states
from maintaining organized troops in time of peace without Congres-
sional consent, and (2) to give to Congress the power to prescribe the
organization, arming and disciplining of the militia. On the other hand
it has been argued that the Second Amendment overrules the above
quoted sections or if not, that the militia are not "troops".' 5  The Amend-
ment provides:
12. Even the liberal age limits of the New Jersey statute, note 10 supra, are not wholly
satisfactory. There are many United States Army officers, recently retired at the age of
sixty-four, who would make exceptionally valuable officers in the higher command of the
State Guards.
13. See commentary to Sections 5 and 6 of the Model Act, p. 51 infra.
14. 86 CoNo. Rncos 20180-85, 20332-36, 76th Cong. 3d Seas. (1940). See also Wiener,
The Militia Clause of the Constitution (1940) 54 H.IAv. L. Rnv. 181, 215-217.
15. Some state cases in the last century took this view. Dunne v. People, 94 Ill. 120,
138 (1879); State ex rel. Madigan v. Wagener, 74 Minn. 518, 523, 77 N. W. 424, 426
(1898); Smith v. Wanser, 68 N. J. L. 249, 258, 52 Atl. 309, 312 (1902). See Wiener,
op. cit. supra note 15. Wiener evidently is of the opinion that the clauses in the main body
of the Constitution do control. This is also the opinion of the writer.
19411
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"A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."
We do not undertake to consider here the merits of the dispute. In
any event the recent adoption of an act by Congress authorizing the
establishment of state guards assures the legality of state legislation.1 6
It will now be in order to consider the provisions of the Model Act.
Section One
Authority and Name. Whenever any part of the National Guard of this
State is in active Federal service, the governor is hereby authorized to organize
and maintain within this state during such period, under such regulations as
the Secretary of War of the United States may prescribe for discipline in train-
ing, such military forces as the governor may deem necessary to defend this
state. Such forces shall be composed of officers commissioned or assigned, and
such able-bodied male citizens of the State as shall volunteer for service therein,
supplemented, if necessary, by men of the [ ],17 militia enrolled by
draft or otherwise as provided by law. Such forces shall be additional to and
distinct from the National Guard and shall be known as the [ State
Guard]. Such forces shall be uniformed.
An examination of the enabling act" discloses two limits upon the
authority of the states to maintain troops of the character of state
guards (if they are to be considered as troops)?1 The first is that they
are authorized to be organized and maintained only "while any part of
the National Guard of the State concerned is in active Federal service."
Hence the state .may not organize such troops before some part of the
National Guard is in actual federal service nor may it maintain them
after all the National Guard of the state has been returned to its state
status. Section One, therefore, has been drafted to conform with the
enabling act in these two respects.
It seems unfortunate that a state which, as under present circum-
16. Public Law No. 874, 76th. Cong. 3d Sess. (1940), amends National Defense Act
§ 61 (1916), 32 U. S. C. A. 194, to read: "No State shall maintain troops in time of peace
other than as authorized in accordance with the organization prescribed under this Act:
. . . provided further, that under such regulations as the Secretary of War may prescribe
for discipline in training, the organization by and maintenance within any State of such mili-
tary forces other than the National Guard as may be provided by the laws of such State is
hereby authorized while any part of the National Guard of the State concerned is in active
Federal service. . .. .
Other provisions of the enabling act will be referred to subsequently.
17. The draft here supplies the following note: "*(Insert appropriate word "reserve",
"unorganized", "sedentary" as provided in State constitution or law)".
18. Note 16, supra.
19. See heading "The Enabling Act", supra p. 45 and note 14.
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stances, has reason to expect that its National Guard will be called into
service within a .few months, cannot at once organize a guard and com-
mence its training in anticipation of that event. It will take a matter
of weeks to enlist the men and complete the organization even before
training can begin. It will take more weeks of training before the Guard
will be shaken down into a really efficient force. So if the whole of the
National Guard is called into federal service at one time there will be
a shorter or longer period during which the state will be without the
efficient protection of the authorized troops. The existence of the situa-
tion is not the fault of the Model Act but of the enabling act and it
seems desirable to secure from Congress an amendment to that act which
will correct this condition of things. If such an amendment is secured
Section One of the Model Act should be revised to conform. As matters
stand now, however, some time can be saved by completing the paper
organization in anticipation of the day when the actual organization can
be commenced and no doubt many states will do so. There appears to
be no legal objection to this.
The second limitation in the enabling act is that the state is subject
to "such' regulations as the Secretary of War may prescribe for dis-
cipline in training" of such troops.Y The phrase "discipline in training"
is somewhat vague, not to say peculiar. It appears to be incorporated
in the act because of the provisions in Article I, Section 8, Clause 16 of
the Constitution, previously quoted.21 The exact limits of this phrase
will have to be determined as time goes on. The draftsmen of the Model
Act did not attempt to do this but were careful to conform to both of
the limits discussed above so that no constitutional question will arise as
to its validity.
Section One does not require the governor to organize a state guard
whenever the National Guard or a part thereof is withdrawn by the
federal government. It is left to his judgment as to whether or not and
when such forces are necessary to the defense of the state. He is given
authority to commission officers in such forces or to assign to command
in such forces officers already commissioned in other military organiza-
tions of the state. Officers in the National Guard Reserve and officers on
the active list of the National Guard who have been rejected by the
federal government as physically unfit for the strenuous work to be
expected of the National Guard on federal service may well be capable
of performing the less arduous duties to be expected of the State Guard.
None but citizens may be accepted as volunteers. Although the militia
20. Note 16, supra.
21. Page 45, supra.
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laws of the several states generally include in the militia all able-bodied
males of the requisite ages who have declared their intention to become
citizens, it was not deemed wise by draftsmen of this act to include
them. Many resident aliens who have declared their intention to become
citizens are intensely loyal to this country and would make useful
members of the guard. If accepted they might, however, be dealt with
as traitors if taken prisoner by the country of their origin. Especially
would that be likely to be so if they were taken in battle. It must be
foreseen that the state guard may be called upon to do battle with small
units of enemy forces as Under Secretary Patterson has pointed out.2
On the other hand some resident aliens probably have recently applied
for citizenship for the very purpose of worming their way into defensive
organizations of this country. The danger to the loyal applicant for
citizenship and the danger to the state are prevented by limiting member-
ship to citizens.3
Doubtless the desired strength of the State Guard can be recruited
from volunteers but provision is nevertheless made, in the unlikely event
that a sufficient number is not forthcoming, to draft under the existing
military law of the state the necessary quota of persons to fill the need.2 4
The forces of the State Guard are required to be uniformed so that they
shall have the protection of international law as recognizable organized
military forces. As such they may not be summarily executed upon
capture as franc-tireurs or guerrillas.2
22. Page 44, supra.
23. See Section 9, also, p. 61, infra. Although Section 1 does not require that officers
commissioned or assigned be citizens, Section 9 does require that only citizens be com-
missioned. It seems, however, that an officer who may be assigned need not be a citizen
of the state unless the law governing the military organization in which he has been
commissioned required citizenship in the state for such a commission. Although, under
Section 1, members of the unorganized militia may be drafted into such forces, and under
the military law of the state able-bodied males who have filed intentions to become citizens
are part of the unorganized militia, it seems doubtful whether Section 9 should be inter-
preted so as to permit their inclusion in the state guard. The term "enlisted" is generally
understood to mean the enlistment of volunteers. "Drafted" or "enrolled" are the terms
usually used when non-volunteers are called up by law.
24. Various provisions exist in the law of the different states authorizing the drafting
or enrolling from the unorganized or reserve militia of persons for military service. See the
heading "Militia Laws", p. 43, supra, and notes thereunder.
25. VA=r-L, LAw oF NATIONS (1852) iii, § 226. Article I, Hague War-Regulations of
1899 as amended in 1907, provides: "The laws, rights and duties of war apply not only
to an army, but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions:
(a) To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (b) to have a fixed
distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; (c) to carry arms openly; and (d) to con-
duct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. In countries where
[Vol. 10
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Section Two
Organization; Rules and Regulations. The governor is hereby authorized to
prescribe rules and regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of this act
governing the enlistment, organization, administration, equipment, maintenance,
training and discipline of such forces: Provided, such rules and regulations,
insofar as he deems practicable and desirable, shall conform to existing
law governing and pertaining to the National Guard and the rules and regula-
tions promulgated thereunder and shall prohibit the acceptance of gifts, dona-
tions, gratuities or anything of value by such forces or by any member of such
forces from any individual, firm, association, or corporation by reason of such
membership.
The Model Act does not attempt to define the numbers of troops
which are to be raised or to direct their division into infantry, artillery,
signal corps, etc. The needs of the different states will vary in this re-
spect and the need in a single state may vary from time to time. It is
not advisable to direct that the existing law pertaining to the National
Guard shall be incorporated in such an act as this because the existing
law with respect to the National Guard conforms with the National
Defense Act of 1916, as amended, with respect to organization, training,
etc. This is because it is contemplated that the National Guard will be
absorbed into the Army of the United States in war times. Many pro-
visions would not, therefore, be suitable to a state guard of the char-
acter contemplated by this act. Nevertheless the legislature by enacting
this section indicates that -its policy is that, insofar as is practicable and
desirable, the existing military law of the state should be made applicable
to these newly authorized forces.
This section does not provide for the disbandment of the Guard. With
respect to this matter the governor is given discretion in one situation
and is legally bound to act in another. Section One authorizes the gover-
nor to "organize and maintain ... such military forces as the governor
may deem necessary to defend this state."2 6 If he deems that all or a
part of the Guard which has been organized is no longer needed, the
governor need no longer maintain it. But when all of the National
Guard is returned from active federal service the state guard must be
disbanded. Under Section One the Guard may be maintained only "when-
ever any part of the National Guard of this State is in active Federal
service."17
the militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or form a part of it, they are included
under the denomination 'army'."
26. Page 46, supra.
27. Page 46, supra. And see the provisions of the Congressional enabling act, note 16,
supra.
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Section Four"
Requisitions; Armories; Other Buildings. For the use of such forces, the
governor is hereby authorized to requisition from the Secretary of War such
arms and equipment as may be in possession of and can be spared by the War
Department; and to make available to such forces the facilities of state armories
and their equipment and such other state premises and property as may be
available.
The Congressional enabling act provides:
"That the Secretary of War in his discretion and under regulations deter-
mined by him, is authorized to issue, from time to time, for the use of such
military units, to -any State, upon requisition of the Governor thereof, such
arms and equipment as may be in possession of and can be spared by the War
Department. '29
This section authorizes the governor to take advantage of the privilege
granted by Congress. The draftsmen have been informed that certain
equipment, particularly rifles, accumulated as a result of the World War
and still in the hands of the War Department, which would be useful
to the state guards, will probably be available.
Companies or other units of the state guards may be formed and
located in towns distant from any armories or other state premises suit-
able for their assembly and drill places. If, by law, school buildings
and grounds may not be used other than for educational purposes, an
appropriate clause should be enacted as part of this section.
A few of the states have already enacted statutes providing for the
organization of state guards in the absence of the National Guard.30 Such
statutes do not contain provisions similar to those of the two which
follow.8 As these two sections are regarded as important and as such
states might desire to add them to their military law, they were set
up separately in another act called the Model Act Providing For Fresh
Pursuit By Military Forces. Obviously the two are also included in the
Model State Guard Act. These sections of the two acts are identical
and are here analyzed together.32
28. Section 3 is not placed in the text. Except for the heading, "Pay and Allowances"
this section is left blank, with the following note: "(Insert here proper provisions for pay
and allowance of officers and enlisted personnel.)" As the policies of the several states in
respect to payment and allowances are expected to differ, no attempt is made by the Model
Act to supply provisions.
29. Public Law No. 874, 76th Cong. 3d Sess. (1940). See 86 CONG. RcoRD 20476,
76th Cong. 3d Sess. (1940).
30. See note 9, supra.
31. See note 33, infra, second paragraph.
32. The opening clause of Section One of the Model Act Providing for Fresh Pursuit by
[Vol. 10
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Section Five
Use without this state. Such forces shall not be required to serve outside
the boundaries of this state except:
(a) Upon the request of the governor of another state, the governor of
this state may, in his discretion, order any portion or all of such forces to
assist the military or police forces of such other state who are actually engaged
in defending such other state. Such forces may be recalled by the governor
at his discretion.
(b) Any organization, unit or detachment of such forces, upon order of
the officer in immediate command thereof, may c6ntinue in fresh pursuit of in-
surrectionists, saboteurs, enemies or enemy forces beyond the borders of this
state into another state until they are apprehended or captured by such orga-
nization, unit or detachment or until the military or police forces of the other
state or the forces of the United States have had a reasonable opportunity to
take up the pursuit or to apprehend or capture such persons: Provided, such
other state shall have given authority by law for such pursuit by such forces
of this state. Any such person who shall be apprehended or captured in such
other state by an organization, unit or detachment of the forces of this state
shall without unnecessary delay be surrendered to the military or police forces
of the state in which he is taken or to the United States, but such surrender
shall not constitute a waiver by this state of its right to extradite or prosecute
such person for any crime committed in this state.
It would be most unfortunate if the work of the state guard is ham-
pered by legal obstacles due to our federal system of sovereign states.
In the absence of the forces of the regular army it might happen that
parachute troops or troops landed by airplane might secure a lodgement
for a time near the borders of two states. The nearby guards of the state
in which such troops landed might be insufficient to cope with the situa-
tion and perhaps nearby forces of a sister state could quickly reach
the scene of danger and join hands with them. In case of such need
there should be no doubt of the authority of the governor of the sister
state to lend aid upon request. This section gives such authority.
In war we cannot conduct our defense in tight compartments. It is
a case of "one for all, and all for one". Lessons from the recent cam-
paigns in Norway, the Low Countries and France teach us that a clever
enemy who plans his campaign with meticulous care and foresight will
be capable of taking every advantage that our separate state jurisdic-
tions will afford him. His "fifth column" friends will also be on the alert
Military Forces reads: "No military forces of this state other than the National Guard
(and the Naval Militia) shall be required to serve outside the boundaries of this state ex-
cept: . . . " The rest of the section is identical with Section Five of the State Guard Act.
19411
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to use state lines as a convenient means to confound those who are hunt-
ing them down.
It does not permit of argument that the pursuit of insurrectionists,
saboteurs or enemy forces should not be abandoned upon arrival at a
state boundary, thus giving precious time to those in flight while the
military or police forces of the state of asylum are brought into action.
This section makes the necessary provision in this regard, fully pro-
tecting the sovereignty and rights of the respective states involved. This
section and the next one carry out the same policy that has been ap-
proved by thirty states which have adopted the Uniform Act On the
Fresh Pursuit of Criminals.3" Congress has likewise approved such a
policy.3 4
The correlative section, granting the consent required in subdivision
(b) of the above section follows:
Section Six
Permission to Forces of Other States. Any military forces or organization,
unit or detachment thereof, of another state who are in fresh pursuit of insur-
rectionists, saboteurs, enemies or enemy forces may continue such pursuit into
this state until the military or police forces of this state or the forces of the
United States have had a reasonable opportunity to take up the pursuit or to
apprehend or capture such persons and are hereby authorized to arrest or cap-
ture such persons within this state while in fresh pursuit. Any such person
who shall be captured or arrested by the military forces of such other state
while in this state shall without unnecessary delay be surrendered to the mili-
tary or police forces of this state to be dealt with according to law. This sec-
tion shall not be construed so as to make unlawful any arrest in this state
which would otherwise be lawful, [and nothing contained in this section shall
be deemed to repeal any of the provisions of the Uniform Act on the Fresh
Pursuit of Criminals.] 35
The adoption by the legislatures of these two above sections will
give not only the sanction of authority, but also a needed protection to
33. See note 57, inffra.
Idaho has a statute from which it may be inferred that troops of another state may be
called to its aid. "No armed military force from another state, territory or district shall
be permitted to enter the state of Idaho for the purpose of doing military duty therein,
without the permission of the governor, unless such force has been called into the active
service of the United States, and is acting under authority of the President of the United
States." IDAHO CoDE ANN. (1932) § 45-110.
34. See terms of the enabling act, note 16, supra, together with notes 56 and 60, infra.
35. This is Section 2 of the Model Act Providing For Fresh Pursuit By Military Forces.
Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 are the usual sections relating to severability, repeal, short title
and time of taking effect.
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the officers and men of the State Guards. It can be foreseen that, in the
heat of pursuit, a unit of the Guard may intentionally ignore a state line
if the prospects are bright that capture will be possible within a mile
or two of distance beyond the borders of its home state. If these sec-
tions are not in effect and an arrest is made, the officer in charge of the
unit might be prosecuted for making an illegal arrest. Furthermore, if,
in order to accomplish his arrest, any injury be done to the one cap-
tured, the officer and his men might be charged with criminal assault or
homicide, on the ground that they were acting without legal authority.
Hence the assault or homicide would not be justifiable, as it would be
if such units are given the authority to make arrests in the state of
asylum.36
36. N. Y. PENAL LAw § 246. "To use or attempt, or offer to use, force or violence upon
or towards the person of another is not unlawful in the following cases:
1. When necessarily committed by a public officer in the performance of a legal
duty; or by any other person assisting him or acting by his direction;
2. When necessarily committed by any person in arresting one who has committed
a felony, and delivering him to a public officer competent to receive him in
custody."
"Any person" seems to include non-citizens, so perhaps, as regards a justifiable assault
the members of the State Guard of another state would be protected in any event by such
statutes.
But as to homicide, the case is not so clear. N. Y. PwAL LAW § 1055: "Homicide is
justifiable when committed by a public officer, or person acting by lzk command and in
his aid and assistance: . . .
3. Necessarily, . . . in arresting a person who has committed a felony and is fleeing
from justice; or in attempting by lawful ways and means to apprehend a person
for a felony actually committed, or in lawfully suppressing a riot, or in lawfully
preserving the peace." (Italics supplied.)
It can be urged that the members of the State Guard of another state are not "public
officers" and are not acting by command of a public officer. Hence these sections are de-
sirable so that the members of the Guard will have the protection of law when they act
in a manner required by the exigencies of the situation.
For the reasons given in the text immediately following, there is little doubt of the
constitutionality of these sections under the Federal Constitution. If, however, we are mis-
taken, authority can still be given to the effect that the members of the Guard would not
be personally liable, if they acted pursuant to these sections.
"Although, as has been seen, an unconstitutional statute must, from the strictly logical
point of view, be regarded as never having had any potency to create legal rights or obli-
gations, practical considerations have led some of the State courts to ascribe a certain
validity to acts committed by persons exercising in good faith powers conferred by acts
which are later held to be unconstitutional. This is in accordance with the general princi-
ples of law which govern de facto officers or corporations.
"There have also been cases in which the existence upon the statute books of a measure
authorizing action that has been taken, though later held to be unconstitutional, has been
held to relieve from civil liability persons acting in good faith upon the assumption that
1941]
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Constitutionality8 7
There seems to be but little question as to the constitutionality of
the above two sections. Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the Constitu-
tion provides:
"No State shall, without the Consent of Congress ... enter into any agree-
ment or compact with another State . . . or engage in War, unless actually in-
vaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay."
It may be argued that the adoption by several states of these sec-
tions does not constitute a compact or agreement among them. Sub-
division (a) .of the first of the pair does not direct the governor to lend
troops and makes no promise to lend them, express or implied. The
governor has absolute discretion as to whether or not they should be
sent. Nor is there any agreement, express or implied, that troops which
are sent shall remain in the requesting state until released by it. The
governor of the lending state may withdraw his troops at his discretion.
Furthermore, although the closing exceptive provisions of the section
of the Constitution above quoted does not qualify the prohibition against
agreements and compacts, but qualifies the prohibition against engaging
in war, nevertheless it gives color to the compact portion of the same
clause. If a state may engage in war when actually invaded or is in
such imminent danger as will not admit of delay, it seems a reasonable
construction of the Compact Clause to hold that it is not intended to
the act was valid. In other cases, however, persons so acting have been held civilly liable
under the doctrine that everyone is presumed to know the law. In Flaucher v. Camden,
(56 N. J. L. 244), a private citizen was held criminally liable for an act assumed by him
to be legal, because of a statute, which statute was later declared by the court to be un-
constitutional." Citing: Nabel v. Bosworth, 198 Ky. 847 (1923); Lang v. Mayor of
Bayonne, 74 N. J. L. 455, 68 Atl. 90 (1907); Henke v. McCord, 55 Iowa 378, 7 N. W.
623 (1880); Shafford v. Brown, 49 Wash. 307, 95 Pac. 270 (1908); Sumner v. Beeler, 50
Ind. 341, 19 Am. Rep. 718 (1875); Kelly v. Bemis, 4 Gray 83 (Mass. 1855); 1 WIL.LOUGH-
BY, Tim CoNsrrruxoi (2d ed. 1929) p. 13.
See also FiatD, TnE Emcr oF Awr UNcoNsTrrTToNAL STATuT (1935) 133-135.
"A member of the armed forces of the United States or any of the several States thereof
is privileged to inflict a harmful contact or otherwise invade another's interests of personal-
ity if such invasion is reasonably necessary for the execution of a command issued by a
superior, if the command is
(a) lawful, or
(b) is believed by the actor to be lawful and is not so palpably unlawful that any
reasonable man would recognize its illegality." RESTATnET, ToRTS (1934)
§ 146.
37. This study of the constitutionality of these sections is largely the work of Caesar
L. Pitassy, Editor-in-Chief of the FoanAm LAw Rmvmw. The writer has checked his
authorities and agrees with his reasoning and conclusions.
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prevent states from collaborating in defense against an enemy. Under
this interpretation, subdivision (a) of the first of these sections is valid
constitutionally, even if it be considered that two states acting under it
are acting pursuant to an agreement.8
As to subdivision (b) it is true that it is not effective unless the state
into which the guard pursues insurrectionists, saboteurs or enemy forces
has given its assent. Such assent is given if the state of asylum has
enacted the second section into law. But this section does not condition
assent upon like assent given to its military forces. Reciprocity is
not essential. State A says: "To whomever it may concern: You
may pursue into our state provided, etc." But it does not add "and
provided you give our troops the same permission." In other words
no consideration is demanded for the permission granted. A mere per-
mission to another is not ordinarily described as an "agreement", but
as a license. 9 If, however, it be answered that action taken by one state
pursuant to license given by another state is action pursuant to an
"agreement", 40 we nevertheless maintain that such an agreement is not
within the intent of the Compact Clause of the Constitution.4'
The Supreme Court has interpreted this clause as not applying to all
compacts or agreements between states, although no case has been pre-
sented in which it has been necessary for the Court to determine au-
thoritatively what type of state compacts and agreements require, the
consent of Congress. In Virginia v. Tennessee42 the Court, in a dictum,43
38. In Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U. S. 538, 572, 14 Pet. 540, 572 (1840), Taney, C. J.,
said: "If there is a verbal understanding, to which both parties have assented, and upon
which both are acting, it is an 'agreement' ". This statement was made in one of the
opinions delivered by an equally divided court upon the question of the validity of the
act of Vermont in arresting the relator for the purpose of surrendering him to Canada
for punishment for a crime committed in Quebec. The case did not involve Article I,
Section 10 in its application to agreements between two state , but in its application to
the prohibition that "no state shall enter into any treaty, alliance or confederation" and
that no state shall enter into any agreement or compact "with a foreign power".
39. The Oxford Dictionary, Concise Edition, defines "permission" as "leave, license
(to do)".
40. Cf. Taney, C.J., in Holmes 'v. Jennison, supra, note 38.
41. Although Section 5 (a) will probably never be invoked except i war, the business
of pursuing saboteurs or insurrectionists may have to be undertaken in time of technical
peace but when war is imminent. Hence the color lent to the Compact Clause by the
closing portion of Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution will not help.
42. 148 U. S. 503 (1893). In this case by concurrent legislation, Virginia and Tennessee
had agreed upon a boundary line between the two states. The question involved was
whether this was a compact prohibited by the Constitution.
43. The language is not necessary to the decision since it was found that Congressional
consent had been indicated by a long series of statutes recognizing the boundary with
respect to judicial and revenue matters.
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for the first time discussed the necessity for Congressional consent to
interstate compacts.44
"Looking at the clause in which the terms 'compact' or 'agreement' appear,
it is evident that the prohibition is directed to the formation of any combina-
tion tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach
upon or interfere with the just supremacy of .the United States." 45
Although this is a dictum it is submitted that this is the logical in-
terpretation.4" Furthermore it has been approved by the courts in other
cases47 and is the only available language of the Supreme Court on the
question of the need for Congressional consent.48 This language and
44. In Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U. S. 538, 14 Pet. 540 (1840) the Supreme Court was
called upon to decide whether or not compliance with a Canadian request for the extra-
dition of a fugitive was a violation of the Compact Clause. Here however the compact
was not an interstate compact, but one with a foreign power.
45. 148 U. S. 503, 519 (1893).
46. In determining the true interpretation of provisions of the Constitution, contem-
porary literature and the Constitutional Convention debates are of some help. However
no aid in this instance is "to be derived from literature contemporary with the Constitu-
tional Convention. There was little or no discussion of these two clauses (Art. I, Sec. 10,
CI. 1 and 3) while the Constitution was in the making. ... " Comment (1922) 31 YArE
L. J. 635, 636.
"The doctrine of noscitur a sociis is relied upon (in interpreting the clauses of the
Constitution) and the argument is made that the words 'treaty', 'compact', and 'agree-
ment' merely take the place of the words 'confederation', 'agreement', 'alliance' and 'treaty'
which are to be found in Article 6 of the articles of confederation, and of the provision
that 'no two or more states shall enter into any treaty, confederation, or alliance whatever
between them' which are contained in the same articles." Bruce, The Compacts and
Agreements of States with One Another and with Foreign Powers (1918) 2 Mnfn=. L. Rxv.
500, 511.
The logical inference to draw from the fact that there was a scarcity of debate in the
Convention, coupled with the doctrine of nosdtur a socils, would be that no material
change in the Articles of Confederation was contemplated by the Convention which framed
the Constitution. It would seem therefore that the real purpose of the Compact Clause
was to prevent those states which were not in complete accord with the Constitution from
banding together and entering into agreements which would tend to increase their political
power and interfere with the functions of the new Federal Government thereby disrupting
the national unity so desired by the framers of the Constitution.
47. North Carolina v. Tennessee, 235 U. S. 1, 16 (1914); Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S.
1, 17 (1900) ; Stearns v. United States, 179 U. S. 223, 246 (1900); Wharton v. Wise,
153 U. S. 155, 168 (1894). See also District Judge Clark's charge to the jury, United
States v. FIegenheimer, 14 F. Supp. 584, 593 n. 1 at p. 596 (1935).
48. This interpretation of the Compact Clause has been criticized by several authors.
"Judicial authority for this position consists, however, of the repetition of an erroneous
dictum in Virginia v. Tennessee. . . ." Note (1935) CoL. L. REV. 76, 78.
"If the arrangement between states is in form a compact or agreement, in the meaning
naturally attaching to those terms, consent should be required without reference to its
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the language of the courts which cite it with approval leave no doubt
as to the lines along which future decisions are likely to follow.49 There-
fore the question is: Will adoption by two or more states of the proposed
act increase the political power of the states,50 and will it interfere with
the just supremacy of the Federal government? We believe not. Co-
operation among the several states for the purpose of circumventing
saboteurs, insurrectionists, and enemy forces can hardly be said to in-
crease the political power of such states. On the contrary such coopera-
tion has the object of preserving the integrity of the states and of the
Union. It moreover cannot logically be argued that such cooperation
will tend to interfere with the just supremacy of the Federal govern-
ment, for the very purpose of the Act is to secure the safety of the
nation against subversive or hostile action by saboteurs, insurrectionists,
and enemy forces. These acts, it should be remembered, are part of a
program undertaken mainly to aid national defense.5
The Court in Virginia v. Tennessee goes on to say:
"So in the case of threatened invasions of cholera, plague, or other causes
of sickness and death, it would be the height of absurdity to hold that the
threatened States could not unite in providing means to prevent and repel
the invasion of the pestilence without the consent of Congress .... "52
subject matter." Comment (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 324, 327.
"Since it is definitely settled that the congressional consent required by the Constitution
may be express or implied, it would have been more satisfactory to hold, in those cases,
(where the courts have intimated that no congressional consent is necessary) that the
consent of Congress was implied from its silent acquiescence after the fact ... " Comment
(1922) 31 YALE L. J. 635, 637.
On the other hand this interpretation has been accepted by prominent Constitutional
scholars.
"... we are led to conclude that only political compacts or agreements which affected
their sovereignty as between themselves or between them and the federal government were
sought to be regulated or controlled." Bruce, op. cit. supra note 46, at 514.
"The consent of Congress is required for interstate agreements having a substantial
tendency to increase the political power or influence of one or more of the states affected."
MAGRUDER & CLARE, Tnn CoNsmTn o (1933) p. 147.
Consent of Congress would be required ". . . if its effect were or might be to increase
the political power of the states involved and to encroach upon the full and free exercise
of federal authority." RoTrscm4E7FE, CoNs =TrIoi AL LAW (1939) § 104.
49. RorrscnuEy , op. cit. supra note 48, § 104.
* 50. The historic example of the type of compact that would increase the political power
of a state and therefore be in violation of the Compact Clause is that of one state under-
taking by compact with another state to cede territory to it. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148
U. S. 503 (1893).
51. See heading "The Federal-State Conference", supra p. 42.
52. 148 U. S. 503, 518 (1893).
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What language could more clearly explain the very purpose of the pro-
posed Act? Who will say that a wave of sabotage is less of a threat to
a state and the nation than "an invasion of cholera"? Who will say
that the visitation of a "plague" constitutes more danger to a state and
the nation than the raising of insurrection?"3 What "greater causes of
sickness and death" can be imagined than those at which the proposed
Act is aimed? Every day the press calls to our attentoin the danger of
sickness and death in conquered and cowed Europe. That the fore-
runner of such danger was sabotage, fifth column activities, insurrec-
tion and invasion is a matter of common knowledge. It is submitted that
"it would be the height of absurdity to hold that the threatened States
could not unite in providing means to prevent and repel the invasion"
of saboteurs, insurrectionists, and enemy forces, "without the consent
of Congress." The sections therefore seem to be the proper use of the
interstate compact for the solution of interstate and national defense
problems which in no way tend to increase the political power of the
states or to usurp the just power of the Federal government and is a
use which has been strongly urged." Therefore we submit that in
accepting what we believe to be, and what the only pertinent judicial
language on the subject can lead one to believe is, the true interpretation
of the Compact Clause of the Constitution, the proposed Act needs no
enabling act from Congress.
However, since the above interpretation of the Constitution has been
doubted,55 it is comforting to know that Congress, in the Ashurst-
Sumners Act of 1934, authorized the states to enter into compacts or
agreements "for mutual assistance in the prevention of crime"." In pur-
53. With our modern advances in the field of medical science, we might bear an inva-
sion of cholera with more equanimity than an invasion of an enemy; and if the scientists
could develop a chemical formula to prevent insurrection and sabotage, they might well
surpass their accomplishments in preventing plagues.
54. Donovan, State Compacts (1931) 80 U. oP PA. L. Rnv. 5; Chafee, Interstate Inter-
pleader (1924) 33 YAL. L. J. 685, 727; Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause
(1925) 34 YALE L. J. 685; Dean, Interstate Compacts for Crime Control (1935) 21 A. B.
A. J. 89.
55. See note 48, supra.
56. "The consent of Congress is hereby given to any two or more States to enter into
agreements or compacts for co-operative effort and mutual assistance in the prevention
of crime and in the enforcement of their respective criminal laws and policies and to
establish such agencies, joint or otherwise, as they may deem desirable for making effective
such agreements and compacts." 18 U. S. C. A. § 420.
The Ron. Hatton W. Sumners, Chairman of Judiciary Committee, House of Repre-
sentatives, one of the sponsors of the above act, is Federal Vice-President of the Interstate
Commission on Crime and a member of the Joint Conference Committee of the Federal-
State Conference on Law Enforcement Problems of National Defense.
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suance of this statute, a Uniform Act on the Fresh Pursuit of Criminals
has been adopted by thirty states.5" The section, of the two acts in
question carry out exactly the same policy as does this existing act
which has found so much favor.
The language of the Ashurst-Sumners Act is very broad and is not
confined to the organized police forces of the states,"8 and would most
certainly cover the parts of these sections which deal with the fresh
pursuit of saboteurs and insurrectionists over the state lines. Finally
it may be said that Congress, by specifically authorizing the states to
create such bodies of troops as the State Guards has impliedly author-
ized their use in a manner that will effectuate their reason for existence. 0
In summary, the constitutionality of these sections may be maintained
upon these grounds: (1) that the adoption by two or more states does
not amount to a compact or agreement among them; (2) that if such
an adoption does amount to a compact or agreement, such is not within
the intended prohibition of the Compact Clause, and (3) that if such
57. The thirty states which have adopted the act are: Arizona, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. The District of Columbia has also
adopted this act. HAx~Doox ON INTERSTATE CaRm= CONTROL (1940) frontispiece table.
Section 6 of the Model State Guard Act is similar in principle to the Uniform Act on
the Fresh Pursuit of Criminals. However the latter act might not be so construed as
to include the action of military forces like the State Guard as it is limited to "any mem-
ber of a duly organized state, county, or municipal peace unit of another state." HLAND-
nooK ON INTERSTATE CRMnS CONTROL, (1940) 15.
Even if the State Guard is considered to be a "peace unit", which seems reasonable,
the Uniform Act on the Fresh Pursuit of Criminals limits authority to make arrests in
the state of asylum to arrests of persons who are believed to have committed a felony
in the state from which they fled. Insurrection is a felony-treason; sabotage may or
may not be a felony. In most states at present it is a misdemeanor-malicious mischief.
Under the Model Sabotage Prevention Act proposed to the states by the Federal-State
Conference it is made a felony.
Enemy forces of a foreign nation, however, are probably not committing a felony under
the common law or under treason statutes. When captured they are not tried in civil
courts. Indeed they are not tried by the military courts, except when acting as spies,
but are kept as prisoners under the Laws of War. Hence the Uniform Act on the Fresh
Pursuit of Criminals does not authorize their capture, as does the Model State Guard Act
and the Model Act Providing for Fresh Pursuit by Military Forces, herein analyzed.
58. See note 56, supra.
59. Sections 5 and 6 of the Model Act to Provide for a State Guard, and Sections
One and Two of the companion act on Fresh Pursuit by Military Forces. See p. 51, supra.
60. The consent of Congress to an agreement between two or more states may be given
otherwise than in the form of an express and formal statement of every proposition of
the agreement, and of its consent thereto. Virginia v. West Virginia, 78 U. S. 39 (1870).
19411
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
adoption is within the intended prohibition of the Compact Clause the
consent of Congress has been given in terms by the Ashurst-Sumners
Act and by implication in the enabling act which authorizes their or-
ganization and maintenance.
Section Seven of the Model State Guard Act
Federal Service. Nothing in this act shall be construed as authorizing such
forces, or any part thereof to be called, ordered or in any manner drafted, as
such into the military service of the United States, but no person shall by
reason of his enlistment or commission in any such forces be exempted from
military service under any law of the United States.
This section follows the wording of the Congressional enabling act.
61
Section Eight
Civil Groups. No civil organization, society, club, post, order, fraternity,
association, brotherhood, body, union, league, or other combination of persons
or civil group shall be enlisted in such forces as an organization or unit.
It is believed that the efficiency of the guard will be increased if the
governor has a free hand to appoint available officers who have had mili-
tary experience and who are qualified in other respects to exercise
command. It also seems wise to leave to the officers a free hand in ap-
pointing the most capable men to non-commissioned posts. If an exist-
ing civil group were accepted in tota as a company or a battalion it is
probable that the group would demand the right to designate its officers
and non-commissioned officers and that it would resist appointments of
persons who were not previously members of the group. Futhermore
some members of any civil group probably would not be physically fit
for membership in military forces of this character. This section does
not, however, conflict with provisions of law existing in some states which
direct that officers in any military forces of the state be elected by its
members.6" The section does not prohibit elections of officers but does
prohibit the enlistment of civil groups as distinct organizations or units
in the guard. It does not, of course, disqualify individual members of
civil groups from acceptance in the guard by reason of such membership.
Sections Nine, Ten and Eleven follow in order, without comment.
61. Public Law 874, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940). "Provided further, that such forces
shall not be called, ordered, or in any manner drafted, as such, into the military services
of the United States; however, no person shall, by reason of his membership in any such
unit, be exempted from military service under any Federal law. .. ."
62. Nor does Section 1, supra p. 46. "Such forces shall be composed of officers com-
missioned. . . ." This does not define the basis for giving commissions.
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Section Nine
Disqualifications. No person shall be commissioned or enlisted in such forces
who is not a citizen of the United States or who has been expelled or dis-
honorably discharged from any military or naval organization of this state, or
of another state, or of the United States.
Section Ten
Oath of Officers. The oath to be taken by officers commissioned in such
forces shall be substantially in the form prescribed for officers of the National
Guard, substituting the words ( State Guard) where necessary.
Section Eleven
Enlisted Men. No person shall be enlisted for more than (one year), but
such enlistment may be renewed. The oath to be taken upon enlistment in
such forces shall be substantially in the form prescribed for enlisted men of
the National Guard, substituting the words ( State Guard) where
necessary.
Section Twelve
Articles of War; Freedom from Arrest; Jury Duty.
(a) Whenever such forces or any part thereof shall be ordered out for
active service the Articles of War of the United States applicable to members
of the National Guard of this state in relation to courts martial, their juris-
diction and the limits of punishment and the rules and regulations prescribed
thereunder shall be in full force and effect with respect to [the State
Guard.]
(b) No officer or enlisted man of such forces shall be arrested on any
warrant, except for treason or felony, while going to, remaining at, or return-
ing from a place where he is ordered to attend for military duty. Every officer
and enlisted man of such forces shall, during his service therein, be exempt
from service upon any posse comitatus and from jury duty.
The composition and jurisdiction of courts martial seems to be a
matter that belongs to the legislature and not one that can legally be
left to executive discretion. So that there cannot be any question as to
the legality of the action of the courts martial, subdivision (a) of this
section is added to the act. Such a provision, incorporating the Articles
of War, is found in most of the state statutes relating to the National
Guard.6 3 Provisions similar to those of subdivision (b) are likewise
found in most of such statutes.64
63. For a typical provision see N. Y. MAI=ARY LAW § 14; N. Y. Consol. Laws Chap.
37, § 14.
64. For a typical provision see PA. STAT. AwN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. $1, §§ 77, 185.
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The Articles of War are punitive and not protective. They provide
for the puflishment of crimes against the civil community committed by
soldiers on active duty, as well as providing for the punishment of purely
military offenses.05 Furthermore Article Seventy-four provides for the
surrender to the civil courts of offenders against the civil law of the state,
except in time of war.6 This Article has been construed by many cases
to preserve the general jurisdiction of the civil courts in time of peace
over persons in military service.67 The adoption of the State Guard Act
will in no way affect the existing law relative to suspending the writ of
habeas corpus.
The remaining sections are the customary ones added to most acts.
Section Thirteen
Severability. If any provision of this act or the application thereof to any
person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other
provisions or applications of the act which can be given effect without the in-
valid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are
declared to be severable.
65. The Articles of War can be found in 10 U. S. C. §§ 1472-1593. The composition of
courts-martial is regulated by Articles 3-7, 10 U. S. C. §§ 1474-1478; jurisdiction by Articles
12-16, 10 U. S. C. §§ 1483-1487; punishments by Articles 41-45, 10 U. S. C. §§ 1512-1516.
The Punitive Articles defining the offenses of which the courts-martial have jurisdiction
comprise Articles 54-96, 10 U. S. C. §§ 1526-1568.
66. Delivery of offenders to civil authorities. Article 74, 10 U. S. C. § 1546, 41 STArr.
§ 803. When any person subject to military law, except one who is held by the military
authorities to answer, or who is awaiting trial or result of trial, or who is undergoing
sentence for a crime or offense punishable under these articles, is accused of a crime or
offense committed within the geographical limits of the States of the Union and the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and punishable by the laws of the land, the commanding officer is
required, except in time of war, upon application duly made, to use his utmost endeavor
to deliver over such accused person to the civil authorities, or to aid the officers of justice
in apprehending and securing him, in order that he may be brought to trial. Any com-
manding officers who upon such application refuses or willfully neglects, except in time of
war, to deliver over such accused person to the civil authorities or to aid the officers of
justice in apprehending and securing him shall be dismissed from the service or suffer such
other punishment as a court-martial may direct.
When, under the provisions of this article, delivery is made to the civil authorities of
an offender undergoing sentence of a court-martial, such delivery, if followed by conviction,
shall be held to interrupt the execution of the sentence of the court-martial, and the offender
shall be returned to military custody, after having answered to the civil authorities for
his offense, for the completion of the said court-martial sentence.
67. Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U. S. 376 (1920); United States v. Hirsch, 254 Fed. 109
(E. D. N. Y. 1918) ;'U. S. ex rel. Drury v. Lewis, 129 Fed. 832, 825 (C. C. A. Pa. 1904)
[app'd 200 U. S. 1 (1906)]; In re Kelly, 71 Fed. 545, 553 (C. C. A. Wis. 1895); Ex parte
Koester, 56 Cal. App. 621, 206 Pac. 116 (1922). Cf. McKittrick v. Brown, 337 Mo. 281,
85 S. W. (2d) 385 (1935).
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Section Fourteen
Repeal. All acts and parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this
act are hereby repealed.
Section Fifteen
Short Title. This act may be cited as the (State Guard Act).
Section Sixteen
Time of Taking Effect. This act shall take effect ( ).68
68. Any information concerning the two acts discussed in this article may be obtained
from the Secretary of the Joint Conference Committee of the Federal-State Conference
on Law Enforcement Problems of National Defense, Hubert R. Gallagher, Esq., 522 Trans-
portation Building, Washington, D. C.
The sub-committee which drafted the Model State Guard Act was composed of the Hon.
Lawrence C. Jones, Attorney General of Vermont, Chairman; the Hon. Thomas J. Herbert,
Attorney General of Ohio; Allen Moore, Esq., Legal Counsel, Division of State and Local
Cooperation, Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense, War Department,
who laid the foundation on which the Act was built; and the writer, Assistant Reporter of
the Interstate Commission on Crime.
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